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CHAPTER 17 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE and GEORGE E. DONOVAN 
A. GENERAL INSURANCE - COURT DECISIONS 
§17.1. General liability insurance: Hold harmless agreement. 
Under a contract with the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority for the 
construction of the Callahan Tunnel under Boston Harbor, the Perini 
Corporation was obligated to "indemnify and save harmless the author-
ity and ... its officers, ... and employees against all suits, claims or 
liability of every name and nature, for or on account of any injuries to 
persons or damage to property arising out of or in consequence of the 
acts of ... [Perini] in the performance of the work covered by the con-
tract and/or failure to comply with ... [its] terms ... whether by him-
self or his employees or subcontractors .... " The Employers' Liability 
Assurance Corporation, Ltd., issued to Perini as insured a Comprehen-
sive General Liability Policy naming both the Authority and the bank 
trustee under an indenture securing bonds issued by the Authority as ad-
ditional insureds. Under this policy the standard insuring language was 
amended by endorsement and, as amended, obligated the insurer "[t]o 
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages for: (a) physical injury to or destruc-
tion of tangible property, or (b) loss of use of such tangible property, 
provided the physical injury thereto was caused by accident." The pol-
icy was also amended to provide that, except as respects loss of use, the 
word "occurrence" was substituted for the word "accident." 
Prior to commencement of construction the Authority acquired by 
eminent domain takings and made available to the contractor all prop-
erty and rights deemed essential by the Authority for the prosecution of 
the work under the contract. During the performance of the contract 
certain property of landowners was physically injured or destroyed, and 
in some cases rights of access were impaired and these landowners ini-
tiated petitions for damages against the Authority.l The Authority 
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§17.1. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 598, conferred upon the Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity power to construct and operate the Callahan Tunnel and to refinance and 
operate the Sumner Tunnel. Section 15 of this act provides in part: "Any person 
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called upon the contractor and the insurer to defend these proceedings 
and save the Authority harmless against the claims. In Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority v. Perini Corporation,2 the Authority sought relief 
for their refusal to do so. The defense contended that Perini had no 
obligation to defend under General Laws, Chapter 79, any petition 
against the Authority or to indemnify it for any judgment obtained up-
on such a petition and that the insurer had no such obligation under its 
policy naming the Authority as an additional insured. The Authority, 
conceding that damages for takings by eminent domain were not Per-
ini's responsibility, argued that Perini and the insurer were bound to 
indemnify it for damages caused to property in the course of the con-
struction. The Supreme Judicial Court, relying on its earlier decision in 
Bryne v. City of Gloucester,S held that the contract of indemnity re-
quired Perini to indemnify the Authority only from claims for Perini's 
acts and omissions causing damage other than damage attributable to 
a taking or inevitable in carrying out the purposes of the taking. Thus 
Perini would be liable only if its acts or omissions were tortious by rea-
son of negligence or strict liability, maintaining a nuisance, participat-
ing in wrongful conduct, taking unauthorized action, or otherwise. 
Clearly, damages for tortious action may not be recovered in a pro-
ceeding under General Laws, Chapter 79.4 It is also clear that since 
damages recoverable under Chapter 79 are either attributable to a 
taking or inevitable in carrying out the work, Perini would have no 
obligation to hold the Authority harmless against claims for such dam-
ages. In the view of the Court the parties did not intend to extend the 
scope of Perini's obligation to the Authority beyond the customary tort 
liability by a transfer to Perini of the liability for compensatory dam-
ages imposed upon the Authority by reason of its appropriation of 
property by eminent domain. If any doubt existed concerning the in-
tentions of the parties, then the contract must be construed against the 
Authority which drafted it. 
The policy of insurance furnished in compliance with the contract 
requirements is customarily written to protect against tort claims and 
the Court would require clear language to warrant interpreting it as 
covering the direct or indirect effects of a sovereign act of appropria-
tion. The substitution of "occurrence" for "accident" did not evidence 
an intention to modify the policy to provide such coverage. Rather, 
this substitution was intended to bring within the coverage injuries 
gradually occurring as contrasted with an injury arising from a sudden 
event, as usually associated with an accident.1I The Court went on to say 
damaged in his property by the exercise of any of the powers granted by this act 
may recover his damages from the Authority under chapter seventy-nine of the 
general laws." 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1081, 208 N.E.2d 807. 
S 297 Mass. 156, 8 N.E.2d 170 (1937). 
4 Holbrook v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 338 Mass. 218, 154 N.E.2d 605 
(1958). 
II See Bean, The Accident Versus the Occurrence Concept, 1959 Ins. L.J. 550, 
2
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that the term "occurrence" may also be designed to expand the coverage 
so that it will be "more nearly as extensive as negligence and other 
forms of tort liability," observing in an interesting footnote that the 
necessity for this type of coverage expansion is probably greater in juris-
dictions which have not taken as broad a view of the word "accident" as 
is reflected in Massachusetts decisions.6 
The naming of additional insureds does not broaden the substantive 
coverage afforded by a policy; it merely extends to the additional in-
sureds the protection given to the named insured.7 Unless the claim, if 
proved, can be brought within the substantive coverage of the policy, 
the insurer has no obligation to defend.8 Consequently, neither Perini 
nor the insurer has any obligation to defend the General Laws, Chapter 
79, petitions brought against the Authority nor any liability to indem-
nify the Authority for any judgments obtained against it. 
§17.2. General liability insurance: Duty to defend. In Vappi & 
Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CO.l the plaintiff sought to recover coun-
sel fees and the cost of engineering services incurred in the defense of a 
suit which the defendant insurer declined to defend on its behalf under 
a Comprehensive General Liability Policy issued to it by the defendant. 
This policy was apparently in the standard form and contained the 
"excavation" exclusion denying coverage for "injury to ... any proper-
ty arising out of ... structural injury to any ... structure due (a) to 
grading of land, excavation ... filling ... pile driving ... caisson work, 
or (b) to moving, shoring ... raising or demolition of any ... structure 
or removal or rebuilding of any structural support thereof." 
The suit in question was commenced as an equity action in which 
the bill alleged that Vappi, in the course of constructing a building for 
Boston University, wrongfully closed and excavated a sixteen-foot pas-
sageway which the complainant was entitled to use for access to her 
land, which abutted the construction site. This bill, asking an assess-
ment of damages and injunctive relief, was dismissed when reached for 
trial on the ground that the complainant no longer sought relief under 
the original bill, but now sought damages for alleged specific acts by 
Vappi. The substituted action at law sought to recover for (a) with-
drawal of water and soil from under her buildings and land causing 
them to settle, (b) some diversion of surface water onto her premises, 
and (c) damage to her land, buildings, and their foundations because 
of vibrations from Vappi's use of trucks and heavy equipment close to 
553; Leslie, Automobile and General Liability Insurance, A.B.A. Section of Insur-
ance, Negligence, and Compensation Law, 1962 Proceedings 70, 84-85. 
6 Cases involving definition of "accident" are collected in Vappi &: Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167, 204 N.E.2d 273, discussed in 
§17.2 infra. 
7 Sonoco Products Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 315 F.2d 126, 128 (10th Cir. 
1963). 
8 Magoun v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964), 
noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.9. 
§17.2. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167,204 N.E.2d 273. 
3
Burgoyne and Donovan: Chapter 17: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1965
246 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §17.3 
her land. Aetna at this point refused Vappi's request to assume the 
defense of this action and took no part in the proceedings, which ulti-
mately resulted in a defendant's verdict. 
So long as the plaintiff's suit merely asserted deprivation of access to 
her property, the contractor's insurer had no obligation to defend since 
any consequent liability of the contractor was clearly not within the 
coverage of the policy. However, when allegations of specific negligent 
acts are introduced into the proceedings, an obligation upon the insurer 
to defend arises if the allegations are reasonably susceptible of the inter-
pretation that they assert injury to property caused by accident and of 
a type not within the excavation exclusion. The insurer's obligation is 
determined by the scope of the allegations and until it succeeds in nar-
rowing claims to those not covered by the policy, it is not relieved of 
this obligation.2 
The Court found that the allegations were not clearly limited to 
activities of a type within the excavation exclusion nor were they clearly 
limited to injuries of a type caused otherwise than by accident. Allega-
tions of a failure to take precautions to prevent the diversion of surface 
water and harmful results from vibrations would permit proof of acts 
and omissions or injuries not within the exclusion. Moreover, these 
allegations are sufficiently general to permit proof of injuries which 
could be regarded as "caused by accident" under the Court's decisions 
holding that unintended or unforeseen consequences of reckless or neg-
ligent acts, and even of intentional acts, at least if not undertaken "with 
malice or intent to injure" the person or property hurt, may be within 
the definition of "accident."s 
Further weakening of the concept of "accident" and the usefulness of 
this word in insurance policies seems inevitable. The Court in this case 
was at pains to remark that it would be slow to adopt any narrow con-
struction of the term "accident" which will limit or defeat any coverage 
fairly intended to be given by a policy described by the insurer in any 
such broad terms as "Comprehensive General Liability Policy." 
§17.3. Liability insurance: Loan receipt agreement. The plaintiff 
trustees in Crocker v. New England Power CO.I brought an action in 
tort against the defendant power company for negligent injury to the 
plaintiffs' property. This action was based upon an allegation that the 
defendant failed to inform the Armor Fence Company, which had been 
engaged by it to install a fence around a new substation, of the exist-
ence of a conduit carrying power cables to the plaintiffs' mill. In the 
digging of a post hole for the fence the conduit was broken, causing a 
power failure which in turn was the cause of the damage to the plain-
tiffs' property. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, as insurer of the 
2 See Magoun v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 
(1946), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.9; Fessenden School, Inc. v. 
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193 N.E. 558 (1935). 
S J. D'Amico, Inc. v. City of Boston, 345 Mass. 218, 186 N.E.2d 716 (1962), dis-
cussed in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1. 
§17.3. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1313, 202 N.E.2d 793, also noted in §5.8 supra. 
4
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fence company, had entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs under 
which it paid to the ptaintiffs the amount of the loss "as a loan, without 
interest, repayable only out of any proceeds of any recovery upon any 
claims or causes of action" arising out of the accident. Liberty Mutual 
was by this agreement appointed attorney in fact for the plaintiffs, with 
sole and irrevocable power to conduct at its own expense all legal pro-
ceedings in connection with the accident. 
The defendant contended that the plaintiffs should not have recovery 
because their claim had been satisfied in full and argued further that 
the loan receipt agreement was a device to evade the rule that there can 
be no contribution among tort-feasors. It has long been established that 
a loan receipt agreement between a plaintiff and his own insurer con-
stitutes a valid loan which does not bar the plaintiff from prosecuting 
his cause of action.2 The validity of such an agreement between the 
plaintiff and the insurer of a party possibly liable in tort to the plaintiff 
was a new question and one of first impression before the Massachu-
setts Court. 
The Court pointed out that the validity of the loan receipt agreement 
in these circumstances has been upheld elsewhere but also noted the 
lack of discussion to support the reasoning of the cases. Believing the 
result desirable, the Court adopted the same view, likewise without dis-
cussion. Moreover, it had no difficulty disposing of the contribution 
argument, taking the position that there never was much logic behind 
the rule prohibiting contribution among tort-feasors.s 
§17.4. Motor vehicle insurance: Uninsured motorists coverage. 
The plaintiff insurer in Employers' Fire Insurance Co. v. Garney1 
sought a declaratory judgment whether a claim for damages was within 
the uninsured motorists coverage of the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle 
Liability Policy issued by the plaintiff to the claimant's father. At the 
trial the judge had made findings of fact and concluded that any dam-
ages sustained by the claimant were covered by the policy. The claimant 
had sustained bodily injury while riding in his father's automobile 
which was struck by a hit-and-run automobile. Following the accident 
the claimant provided the insurance company with a detailed accident 
report on the company's accident report form, but at no time filed with 
the company the sworn statement required by the terms of the policy 
when the accident involves a hit-and-run automobile.2 There was no 
2 August A. Busch &: Co. of Massachusetts v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 
239, 158 N.E.2d 351 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1; National 
Shawmut Bank v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 488, 58 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1945). 
S G.L., c. 231B, added by Acts of 1962, c. 730, changed this rule in Massachusetts. 
See discussion in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.ll. 
§17.4. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 391, 205 N.E.2d 8. 
2 For the purposes of bringing injuries caused by hit-and-run automobilel within 
the coverage of Part II of the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Liability Policy 
("Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Automobiles'') the policy in-
cludes the following definition: "'Hit-and-Run Automobile' means an automobile 
which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such 
automobile with the insured or with an automobile which the insured is occupying 
5
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evidence that the company requested the defendant to furnish such a 
sworn statement. 
The claimant contended that under the provisions of General Laws, 
Chapter 175, Sections 102 and l86B, the filing of the sworn statement 
is unnecessary inasmuch as he had given the insurance company sea-
sonable notice of the accident.3 The company took the position that 
these statutory provisions relieve an insured of the consequences of a 
failure to file the customary proof of claim or proof of loss and not of 
a failure to file a sworn statement that the insured has a cause of action 
against a person whose identity is unascertainable. The company's ef-
fort to distinguish between the proof of claim required under the 
"Proof of Claim" condition4 of the policy and the sworn statement re-
quired of an insured claiming damages against an unidentified and 
unascertainable person was rejected by the Court. 
The Court held that both the sworn statement called for by the hit-
and-run definition and the written proof of claim, if sworn to, were 
sworn statements of loss as that term is used in Section 186B. Failure 
of the claimant to render either of these statements did not impair his 
claim since the company had received prompt and full notice of loss. 
If the company needed more information the burden was on it to make 
a request for such additional information. 
The Court also addressed itself in this case to the question of the 
extent to which a claim under the Uninsured Motorists Coverage must 
be submitted to arbitration,1I although it is unclear what precise matter 
at the time of the accident, provided: (1) there cannot be ascertained the identity 
of either the operator or the owner of such 'hit-and-run automobile'; (2) the insured 
or someone on his behalf shall have reported the accident within 24 hours to a 
police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall 
have filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under oath that 
the insured or his legal representative has a cause or causes of action arising out 
of such accident for damages against a person or persons whose identity is un-
ascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support thereof; and (3) at the com-
pany's request, the insured or his legal representative makes available for inspection 
the automobile which the insured was occupying at the time of the accident_" 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
3 Section 102 protects the insured under a Massachusetts Standard Fire Policy 
against forfeiture of coverage for failure to render the proof of loss required 
under the policy, provided the insured gives notice of the loss, forthwith upon 
occurrence of the loss, to the company and complies with a written request of 
the company to furnish it with a sworn statement of loss. 
Section l86B, enacted by Acts of 1959, c. 168, extends this protection to an 
insured who has failed to render a sworn statement of loss under any type of 
policy issued in the Commonwealth. 
See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.14. 
4 Condition 2 of the policy applicable to the Uninsured Motorists Coverage 
provided in part as follows: "As soon as practicable, the insured or other person 
making claim shall give to the company written proof of claim, under oath if 
required, including full particulars of the nature and the extent of injuries, 
treatment, and other details entering into the determination of the amount pay-
able ..•. " 
II The "Arbitration" Condition of the policy applicable to the Uninsured 
Motorists Coverage provided in part as follows: "If any person making claim 
6
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thought to be arbitrable was in dispute. This question was not reached 
in the only Massachusetts case6 which has involved the arbitration 
clause because the parties were in agreement that coverage questions 
are not a subject for arbitration under the applicable statutory provi-
sions.7 In the leading case of Rosenbaum v. American Surety Co. of 
New York8 the New York Court of Appeals in a four-to-three decision 
held that the policy agreement to arbitrate did not encompass a dispute 
between the insurer and the insured on the preliminary issue as to 
whether the automobile driven by the tort-feasor was uninsured. 
Specifically adopting the view of the minority in the Rosenbaum case, 
the Supreme Judicial Court in the present case held that whether a 
particular situation of fact comes within the policy provisions, assum-
ing their meaning has been determined, was a matter which may be 
submitted to arbitration. Examples offered were whether the other 
motorist was or could be identified, whether he was insured, whether 
his acts or omissions caused the accident, whether he was negligent, and 
whether the insured was guilty of contributory negligence. It would ap-
pear that the Court was persuaded that the arbitration provision should 
be read as applying not only to questions of "liability" and "damages," 
as was intended by the language, but also to some questions of coverage. 
It does not appear that the question raised by the plaintiff's petition re-
garding the insured's compliance with the conditions of the policy 
necessary to recovery was an arbitrable question. 
§17.5. Motor vehicle insurance: Loading and unloading. In Im-
proved Machinery, Inc. v. Merchants Mutual Insurance CO.l the plain-
tiff insured and its general liability insurer sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the plaintiff insured's automobile liability insurer was 
obligated to defend suit brought against the plaintiff insured. The 
automobile liability policy issued by the defendant insurer covered the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of automobiles owned by the insured 
and contained the standard provisions defining "use" to include load-
ing and unloading of the automobile, and defining "insured" to include 
any person using the automobile with the permission of the insured. 
The insured, having sold a piece of heavy manufacturing machinery 
which failed to operate satisfactorily, decided to replace a portion of 
hereunder and the company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to 
recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because 
of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the amount of payment 
which may be owing under this coverage, then, upon written demand of either, 
the matter or matters upon which such person and the company do not agree 
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association .... " 
6 Fazio v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 347 Mass. 254, 197 N.E.2d 598 
(1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.4. 
7 G.L., c. 175, §l1lD, added by Acts of 1959, c. 438, §2, discussed in 1959 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §16.8. 
811 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962). 
§17.5. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1095,208 N.E.2d 796. 
7
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the machinery which had been installed in the buyer's plant. The 
buyer leased a forklift with an operator to unload from the insured's 
truck the new piece of equipment and to load the defective equipment 
onto its truck. While the forklift operator was using the forklift to load 
the defective machinery onto the insured's truck the weight of the 
machinery caused the forklift to tip over, striking and killing an em-
ployee of the buyer. The Court held on these facts that the automobile 
liability insurer was obligated to assume the defense of the suit, not a 
surprising result in the light of the broad sweep given by it to the un-
loading operation in the earlier Busch case.2 
The defendant apparently also sought to avoid liability on the 
ground that the forklift operator was not an insured under the policy, 
relying on Nichols 6- Co. v. Travelers Insurance CO.8 The Court re-
jected this argument, pointing out that the policy in the Nichols case 
contained a narrower definition of "insured" than that contained in 
the present policy. 
§17.6. Agents and brokers: Liability. The plaintiff, in Schooner 
Dartmouth, Inc. v. Piper,1 sought to recover from the defendant, an 
insurance broker, damages sustained as a consequence of the plaintiff's 
reliance upon the broker's representation of the coverage afforded by 
a marine Protection and Indemnity Policy. The schooner Dartmouth 
was involved in a collision at sea with another vessel at a time when the 
Dartmouth was covered by $22,500 of hull insurance, an amount equal 
to 50 per cent of its appraised value. The broker had been unable to 
obtain hull insurance to the full value of the vessel, despite diligent 
efforts to do so. Under the standard hull policy, coverage for damage 
to others is in the amount of the value of the insured vessel, or if the 
policy is written for a lesser amount than such value, then for the pro-
portion of the loss that the amount of insurance bears to the appraised 
value of the vessel. 
In these circumstances the plaintiff instructed the broker to procure 
a renewal of its Protection and Indemnity Policy in the amount of 
$100,000. The broker had advised "that if the vessel was in collision and 
caused damage to others, the P & I insurance would pick up the liability 
where the hull insurance left off," and the plaintiff had understood this 
to mean that in case of collision at sea causing damage to another vessel 
the Dartmouth would be fully covered by insurance. In fact, the P & I 
coverage attached only to that portion of a loss which exceeded the 
value of the insured vessel, so that a loss up to that amount would be 
borne by the hull insurers. As a consequence the hull insurer paid one 
half the $15,000 judgment obtained against the Dartmouth and the 
2 August A. Busch &: Co. of Massachusetts v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 339 
Mass. 239, 158 N.E.2d 351 (1959), discussed in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1. 
For a review of the cases, see Annotations, 95 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1964), supplementing 
160 A.L.R. 1259 (1946). 
8343 Mass. 494, 179 N.E.2d 593 (1962), discussed in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §16.6. 
§17.6. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 94!l, 208 N.E.2d 214. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/20
§17.7 INSURANCE 251 
P Be I insurer had no liability with respect to the balance, which was 
paid by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff, in seeking to recover from the broker for its uninsured 
loss, relied squarely and solely upon the contention that the broker's 
statement was made in the course of the sale of an insurance policy, as 
agent of the seller, and was an express warranty as to the nature of the 
coverage afforded by the P & I policy. The plaintiff did not seek to re-
cover on the theory of an innocent misstatement of an existing fact 
susceptible of knowledge,2 although the broker's statement could rea-
sonably be construed as a representation of the prevailing view of 
insurance underwriters with regard to the coverage of the P & I policy. 
Neither did the plaintiff seek to rely on any negligence of the broker as 
agent of the plaintiff compensated to obtain the necessary insurance.3 
The broker could have made an express warranty concerning the 
coverage of the policy in question but, in the opinion of the Court, 
there was here no such undertaking in express words and no facts upon 
which to imply one. Moreover, the broker's statement formed no part 
of a sale, nor was it made to induce a sale or to obtain a commission. 
His duty to the plaintiff in respect to this statement arose from his 
position as agent of the plaintiff providing professional insurance ad-
vice and procuring insurance policies at the plaintiff's direction. On the 
issue as tried, the plaintiff cannot have recovery. 
§17.7. Payroll robbery insurance: Robbery defined. Austin L. 
Burgess, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty CO.l involved a policy 
issued by the defendant insurer obligating it, among other losses, to 
"pay for ... direct loss of or damage to payroll ... caused by robbery 
... from a custodian performing any of his regular duties with such 
payroll." "Robbery," in pertinent part, is defined by the policy to mean 
"the felonious taking of insured property (1) by violence inflicted upon 
a custodian; (2) by putting him in fear of violence; (3) by any other 
overt felonious act committed in his presence and of which he is 
actually cognizant .... " The plaintiff suffered the loss of a payroll when 
its custodian, carrying the payroll in a paper bag from the bank to his 
automobile, discovered he had a flat tire on the right rear wheel (after-
ward determined to have been deliberately caused), placed the bag 
containing the payroll under his hat in the open trunk of the auto-
mobile, and proceeded to remove the flat tire and replace it with the 
2 The Court suggested that recovery may have been had upon the theory of 
Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888), citing Prosser, 
Torts §102 at 724-725 (3d ed. 1964); Williston, Sales §197 (rev. ed. 1948); Bohlen, 
Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 746-
747 (1929); Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Mis-
representation, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 749, 771 (1930); Williston, Liability for Honest Mis-
representation, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 415, 420-422, 435 (1911). 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 943, 
946, 208 N.E.2d 214, 216. 
3 Rapp v. Lester L. Burdick, Inc., 336 Mass. 438, 146 N.E.2d 368 (1957), and 
Rayden Engineering Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 151 N.E.2d 57 (1958), dis-
cussed in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.1. 
§17.7. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 379, 205 N.E.2d 1. 
9
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spare. In the course of this operation the automobile jack slipped and 
the custodian was obliged to go to the front of the automobile to chock 
the right front wheel. There was testimony that the custodian noticed 
a "suspicious looking person" when he emerged from the bank and 
that he saw no one in sight when he looked to see if anyone was around 
when he left the rear of the automobile. Upon completion of the tire-
changing, the custodian picked up his hat only to discover that the bag 
of money was gone. 
The defendant insurer appealed a denial of its motion for a directed 
verdict. The plaintiff's case rested upon the policy provision defining 
robbery to include any other overt felonious act committed in the 
custodian's presence and of which he is actually cognizant. While there 
may have been sufficient evidence to support a finding that a robbery 
was committed in the custodian's presence, there was no basis for find-
ing that the custodian had actual knowledge of a felonious act during 
its commission. Without such actual knowledge, the loss cannot be 
brought within the clear intent of the coverage. 
§17.8. Surety bonds: Scope of undertaking. Treasurer and Re-
ceiver General v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance CO.l involved 
an individual, one Gerald Carpenter, obligated to satisfy two statutory 
bonding requirements, one as the operator of a collection agency2 and 
the other as a deputy tax collector.s The defendant was surety on Car-
penter's bond as operator of a collection agency and subsequently be-
came surety on his deputy tax collector's bond, which continued in 
force from April 24, 1958, the date of Carpenter's appointment, until 
December 31, 1958. Thereafter, Peerless Insurance Company became 
surety on the deputy tax collector's bond until Carpenter was removed 
from the deputy collector's office on May 8, 1959. During the period 
that Carpenter was deputy collector he collected and neglected to pay 
over to town officials taxes substantially in excess of the sum of the 
penalties of the two deputy collector's bonds issued by the defendant 
and by Peerless. In this action the town sought to recover the excess loss 
from the defendant as surety on Carpenter's collection agency bond. 
The Court found that a collection agency bond does not cover the per-
formance of a tax collector's duty to account for collected funds. Two 
different statutory requirements were involved, one dealing with the 
regulation of trade, the other with the bonding of public officials 
charged with the duty of collecting taxes. The former requires bonding 
as a condition of licensing to carryon a business, which cannot be con-
ducted without license. The latter requires bonding to guarantee per-
formance of a public trust. That the principal in these bonds collected 
both taxes and private debts is purely a coincidence; it cannot enlarge 
the obligation of the surety on the collection agency bond. 
A second case decided during the 1965 SURVEY year involving a surety 
§17.8. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 845, 207 N.E.2d 684. 
2 C.L., c. 93, §§24-28. 
SId.. c. 60, §92. 
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bond was Sands, Taylor &- Wood Co. v. American Insurance CO.4 The 
bond was given to vacate a default judgment against the principal, one 
Richard D. Bowman.1I Bowman's Bakery, Inc., was also a defendant in 
the action, but the default judgment against it was not vacated. On a 
subsequent trial on the merits, Bowman prevailed. The plaintiff there-
after sought to hold the surety liable for the original default judgment 
against Bowman's Bakery, Inc. Judgment of the trial court for the de-
fendant surety was affirmed on the double ground that (1) the statute 
requires the bond to be conditioned upon satisfaction of a judgment 
against only the petitioner to vacate, and (2) if judgment is vacated, the 
condition is that the petitioner shall satisfy the execution on any judg-
ment thereafter rendered in the action. If, as in this case, the petitioner 
prevails and the judgment is vacated, the condition of the bond6 is 
satisfied and the obligation of the surety is terminated. The language of 
the bond condition cannot be construed as referring to a judgment 
previously recovered against another defendant who is a stranger to 
the proceedings to vacate judgment for which the bond was given. 
B. GENERAL INSURANCE - LEGISLATION 
§17.9. Stock companies: Securities regulation. In 1964 the Con-
gress of the United States amended1 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
to extend to certain over-the-counter securities the same registration 
and periodic reporting requirements as apply to those securities which 
are listed on a national securities exchange. The 1964 amendments were 
enacted to carry out the legislative recommendations made by a special 
study committee of the Securities Exchange Commission following a 
lengthy study of the adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the 
rules of the stock exchanges. The legislative bill, as introduced, would 
by its terms include securities issued by stock insurance companies. 
During the legislative hearings, the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners opposed the application of the new requirements 
to stock insurance company securities because to do so would (a) sub-
ject such securities to dual regulation, and (b) constitute a departure 
from the doctrine of the McCarran Act2 which reserves to the several 
states the regulation of the business of insurance. The NAIC, not ob-
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1111,209 N.E.2d 189, also noted in §~.6 supra. 
II G.L., c. 250. §17, prescribes the form of the bond to be given to the adverse 
party by the petitioner before a judgment is vacated and execution is stayed. 
6 The bond executed by the surety on behalf of Richard D. Bowman contained 
the following: "Now, Therefore. if the said Richard D. Bowman shall within thirty 
(W) days after final judgment in aforesaid action pay to Sands. Taylor Be Wood, 
Inc. the amount if any which they shall recover plus costs (not to exceed the penal 
amount of this bond). then this obligation shall be void. otherwise to remain in 
full force." 
§17.9. 1 Pub. L. 88-467, approved August 20. 1964. 78 Stat. 565, amending 15 
U.S.C. §§77d, 78c, 781-78o-~. 78p. 78t. 78w. 78ff (1964 Supp.). 
2 Pub. L. No. 15. 79th Cong .• 1st Sess .• c. 20. approved March 9. 1945. 59 Stat. ~4, 
15 U.S.C. §§IOll-1015 (1964). 
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jecting to the concept of security regulation but to the jurisdiction of 
the federal agency, sought and obtained a two-year moratorium period 
within which to enact necessary regulatory legislation in the states. 
The bill as enacted exempts securities issued by stock insurance 
companies if (I) the company files with its home state an annual state-
ment in the form prescribed by the NAIC; (2) the company is, with 
regard to proxies, consents, or authorizations in respect of its securities, 
subject to regulation by its home state and such regulations conform 
to those prescribed by the NAIC; and (3) after July I, 1966, the pur-
chase and sale of the company's securities by beneficial owners, direc-
tors, and officers are subject to regulation by the company's home state 
substantially in the manner provided in Section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act.a To meet the requirement of substantially equivalent 
regulation the NAIC is seeking the enactment by the states of a "model 
insider trading statute" which affords Section 16 protection. 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 354,4 enacted this legislation in Massachusetts 
and made it applicable to securities of a domestic stock insurance com-
pany unless (a) its securities are registered or required to be registered 
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act,!; or (b) its securities 
are not held of record by 100 or more persons as of the last business 
day of the next preceding year. It requires reporting of changes in 
stockholdings by any person who is a director, officer, or beneficial 
owner of more than 10 per cent of a security issue of the company and 
makes short term profits subject to recapture by the company within 
two years following the date such profit is realized. It further requires 
that solicitations of proxies be in accordance with rules and regulations 
to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Insurance and be accompanied 
by such information, including financial statements, as are specified by 
regulation. In the event no such proxy solicitation is made, the com-
pany is obliged, nevertheless, prior to its annual meeting, to file with 
the Commissioner and transmit to the holders of record the security 
information which would be required to accompany a proxy solicita-
tion. The usual periodic reporting requirement will be satisfied by the 
statement required to be filed each year by all insurance companies 
with the Commissioner of Insurance.6 
§17.10. Agents and brokers: Licensing. Acts of 1965, Chapter 125, 
eliminated the statutory restriction l upon the number of officers and 
directors who can be authorized to act under the license of a corporate 
a Pub. L. 88·467, §3(c), amending 15 U.S.C. §§781, 78p (1964 Supp.). 
4 Adding Section 1931 to G.L., c. 175. 
5 15 U.S.C. §781 (1964 Supp.). 
6 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has adopted a uniform 
reporting form, known as the convention blank, which has been adopted for use 
by every state. A special committee of the NAIC has developed a "stockholders' 
information supplement," which is to become a part of this basic annual report as 
submitted by stock companies for the 1964 and subsequent report years. All of the 
states have agreed to adopt this standard supplement. 
§17.IO. 1 G.L., c. 175, §174. 
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agent or broker and leaves the determination of the number of indi-
viduals who may act under such a license to the discretion of the Com-
missioner of Insurance. 
§17.11. Motor vehicle insurance: Minors' policies. Heretofore 
minors who have attained the age of fifteen have been deemed com-
petent by the statute to contract for life or endowment insurance. Acts 
of 1965, Chapter 403,1 was enacted, following several years of efforts to 
obtain such legislation, to make minors who have attained the age of 
sixteen (the minimum age for licensing to operate motor vehicles) com-
petent to contract for motor vehicle insurance. For reasons difficult to 
comprehend, the policies which the minor may no longer disaffirm are 
those affording compulsory insurance only2 or those issued under the 
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Assigned Risk PlanS which, at the 
option of the insured, may afford, in addition to the compulsory in-
surance, extraterritorial, guest, and property damage liability coverages. 
Not within the protection of the new law are policies voluntarily 
written by insurers to afford more coverage than is required under the 
compulsory insurance law. This could increase the number of insureds 
using the facilities of the Assigned Risk Plan either as a consequence 
of the underwriting reluctance of the companies to assume such minor 
risks or of the minors' determination to obtain coverage broader than 
the compulsory requirement. In any case, the limitation of the statute 
seems to make little sense, even recognizing the rather sympathetic 
attitude of the legislature toward young drivers. 
§17.12. Motor vehicle insurance: Policy approval. Acts of 1965, 
Chapter 383,1 requires all motor vehicle liability and physical damage 
policies to be filed for approval by the Commissioner of Insurance. No 
such policy may be used for a period of thirty days following such 
filing unless it is sooner approved in writing by the Commissioner. 
Unless the policy form is, within the thirty-day period, disapproved in 
writing by the Commissioner, with a specification of his reasons for 
disapproving, the form will be deemed to be approved. 
§17.13. Liability insurance: Medical examination. Acts of 1965, 
Chapter 369, added to the insurance law a new section1 which requires 
a liability insurer to furnish, upon request, to the injured party or his 
attorney copies of the reports of medical examinations of the injured 
party made by the insurer, provided the injured party, upon request of 
insurer, furnished to the insurer copies of reports of all medical exami-
nations and treatment made by his attending physician. 
§17.11. 1 Adding to G.L., c. 175, a new §113K. 
2 G.L., c. 90, §34A, defines the insurance coverage required as a condition for the 
registration of a motor vehicle. 
SId., c. 175, §113H, prescribes certain provisions to be incorporated in a motor 
vehicle assigned risk plan and requires its approval by the Commissioner of 
Insurance. 
§17.12. 1 Amending G.L., c. 175, §22A. 
§17.13. 1 G.L., c. 175, §ll1F. 
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§17.14. Accident and health insurance: Dependent's benefits. Acts 
of 1965, Chapter 112, amended the individual accident and sickness 
policy provisions law1 to bring within the definition of eligible depen-
dent children the children of adopting parents during the pendency 
of adoption procedures. 
§17.15. Group disability insurance: Eligible groups. Acts of 1965, 
Chapter 309, amended the definition of group disability insurance1 to 
permit the issuance of a group disability policy insuring against loss of 
time to a bank, association, financial or other institution, or to the 
trustees designated by two or more of such institutions and covering 
debtors, guarantors, or purchasers for amounts not in excess of the 
indebtedness or unpaid balance of the purchase price. 
C. LIFE INSURANCE - COURT DECISIONS 
§17.16. Accidental death coverage. Gilmour v. Security Mutual 
Casualty Co.,! decided during the 1965 SURVEY year, was an action by 
beneficiaries upon a policy insuring against loss of life resulting "di-
rectly and independently of all other causes from accidental bodily 
injury." The insured collapsed and died after running a mile on a 
track while participating in a high school athletic program. A death 
certificate stated the cause of death to be "presumably cardiac exhaus-
tion." The Supreme Judicial Court in its rescript opinion affirming an 
order for judgment for the defendant stated that the evidence, as recited 
above, was not proof that death resulted from accidental injury. 
In support of its decision the Court cited three cases,2 each involving 
policy provisions insuring against death by external, violent, and ac-
cidental means. But a distinction may be drawn between such provi-
sions and those insuring merely against accidental death, without men-
tion of the external means or cause of death. Under the accidental 
means kind of provision "[i]t is not sufficient that the death ... may 
have been an accidental result ot the external cause, but that cause it-
self must have been ... accidental."8 For example, it has been held 
that under such a provision there can be no recovery for death unin-
tentionally resulting from inhalation of a nasal douche, where the act 
of inhalation was exactly what the insured intended .• If the word "ac-
cident" in its common signification' "means an unexpected happening 
without intention or design"l1 it is clear that the fatal result of the in-
§17.l4. 1 G.L., c. 175, §108, specifically par. (a) of subd. 2. 
§17.15. 1 G.L., C. 175, §110. 
§17.16. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 251, 204 N.E.2d 502. 
2 Cooper V. Prudential Insurance Co., !l29 Mass. !l01, 107 N.E.2d 805 (1952); 
Henderson V. Travelers Insurance Co., 262 Mass. 522, 160 N.E. 415 (1928); Smith V. 
Travelers Insurance Co., 219 Mass. 147, 1(i6 N.E. 607 (1914). 
8 Id. at 149, 106 N.E. at 608. 
4 Ibid. 
II Henderson V. Travelers Insurance Co., 262 Mass. 522, 525, 160 N.E. 415, 416 
(1928). 
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halation was accidental. But it is equally clear that, where the means 
producing the result are precisely what the insured intended, those 
means are not accidental. And where accidental means is the test, there 
can be no recovery for a mere accidental result. In Reeves v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CO.6 it was held that there could be no 
recovery under "death by accidental means" provisions where the in-
sured died from a strangulated hernia occasioned by his lifting of 
mortar tubs. The evidence did not warrant a finding that this lifting 
was unintentional or at the time was accompanied by any unexpected 
occurrence. The Court said: 7 "Here the lifting itself was not attended 
by accident although the consequences to the insured were unforeseen. 
The case is illustrative of the distinction to be observed between ac-
cidental result and accidental cause."8 
In the Gilmour case the provision did not expressly require that 
death result from accidental means, and the cases cited in support of 
the decision are technically inapposite. Nevertheless the result reached 
is correct. Even if the death were the unintended and therefore acci-
dental result of running, there was nothing to indicate it so resulted 
"independently of all other causes." Neither the death certificate as 
recited by the Court nor any other medical evidence negatived the 
active co-operation of disease or some other cause in producing cardiac 
exhaustion. Since the lack of any such contributing cause could not be 
inferred from the evidence, the plaintiffs failed to show that the death 
was within the coverage. 
§17.17. Taxation of policy proceeds. In DeVincent v. Commis· 
sioner of Corporations and Taxation1 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the proceeds of policies on the life of a decedent, who while in the 
hospital two months before his death set up a trust for the benefit of his 
family and named the trustees beneficiaries of the policies, were not 
taxable under General Laws, Chapter 65, Section I, as a gift made in 
contemplation of death. 
The Court relied upon its earlier decisions in Tyler v. Treasurer and 
Receiver General2 and Welch v. Commissioner of Corporations and 
Taxation,8 stating: 
[Their] reasoning ... was broad, and substantially proceeds on 
the principle that the payment of insurance proceeds at the death 
of the insured has not been subjected to succession tax by the 
Legislature. Although the facts of these cases directly raised only 
the question whether insurance proceeds could be taxed ... as 
gifts to take effect in possession at or after the insured's death, most 
6333 Mass. 314, 130 N.E.2d 541 (1955), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.7. 
7 Id. at 316, 130 N.E.2d at 542. 
8 Contrast Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co., 310 Mass. 370, 38 N.E.2d 333 
(1941), applying foreign law. 
§17.17. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 547, 206 N.E.2d 81. 
2226 Mass. 306, 115 N.E. 300 (1917). 
8 309 Mass. 293, 34 N.E.2d 611 (1941). 
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of what was said ... seems appropriate to exclude a tax upon 
such insurance proceeds as a "gift ... made in contemplation of 
the death of the ... donor."4 
The Court noted that the application of the federal estate tax to the 
proceeds of life insurance policies is almost entirely a development 
which has taken place since the decision of the Tyler case, and said 
that the fact that there had been a change in concepts of transfers 
within both state and federal taxation statutes was insufficient reason to 
change by judicial decision the long-standing interpretation of General 
Laws, Chapter 65, Section l. In Tyler the Court, in determining that 
the policy proceeds were not subject to succession tax, stated that taxing 
statutes are to be strictly construed, and gave weight to the practical 
construction put on the law by those charged with its enforcement 
through many years. That decision has been relied upon for almost 
fifty years. If any change is now to be made, concluded the Court in 
the DeVincent case, it should be done by the legislature. 
§17.18. Insurer's defense of misrepresentation in application: 
Hodgkin's disease; alteration of application. In two cases decided 
during the 1965 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that, 
as a matter of law, misrepresentation in an application for a life insur-
ance policy of medical history concerning a condition diagnosed as 
Hodgkin's disease entitles the insurer to avoid the policy. The first of 
the cases was Pahigian v. Manufacturers' Life Insurance CO.l The in-
sured in his application, dated December 28, 1960, denied he had had 
disturbances of the glandular system such as enlarged glands, tumor, 
cancer, X-rays, weight change in past year, illness, injury, operation, or 
medical examination not already mentioned, and denied that at the 
time of the application he had any disease or symptoms of disease. The 
application form called for "full particulars, condition, dates, duration, 
results, full names and addresses of doctors, hospitals and clinics." The 
only response to this was, "Usual childhood diseases good recovery." 
The words "good recovery" were inserted after the application had 
been completed. 
There was evidence in behalf of the company that from April, 1959, 
until the time of his death the insured underwent treatment for a 
swelling on his neck. From April 12 to April 15, 1959, he was hospital-
ized at a medical center whose records showed a discharge diagnosis 
of "Hodgkin's Disease, adenopathy, left neck; surgery performed: ex-
cision of glands, left neck." Thereafter he was hospitalized at a Veterans 
Administration hospital on eight occasions, the first being from April 
24 to May 28, 1959, and another from August 9 to September 7, 1960. 
The hospital records showed a diagnosis of Hodgkin's disease. The de-
fendant's medical expert testified on the basis of the hospital records 
that the insured had Hodgkin's disease which had reached its most 
4 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 547, 549·550, 206 N.E.2d 81, 83. 
§17.18. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 645,206 N.E.2d 660, also noted in §10.4 supra. 
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serious stage by September, 1960, at which time the insured had only a 
10 per cent chance of surviving five years. He testified that X-ray treat-
ment should be given to combat the disease and that the insured re-
ceived such treatment. 
The plaintiff, widow of the insured, was called by the defendant and 
testified that besides his 1959 and 1960 hospitalizations the insured had 
been attending a Veterans Administration clinic up until December 27, 
1960, the day before his application. The insured died of Hodgkin's 
disease, but it was unknown if he ever knew what his ailment was. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held there was error in the trial court's 
refusal to direct a verdict for the insurer. The Court stated the usual 
rules that misrepresentations in an application which are made with 
actual intent to deceive or which increase the risk of loss will enable the 
company to avoid the policy,2 but that the burden is on the company 
to show the misrepresentations and such actual intent or such increase 
of the risk. It noted that although the issue of increase of risk is usually 
a question of fact, misrepresentations as to certain diseases, such as 
cancer,s require, as a matter of law, the conclusion that the risk is in-
creased. The Court adverted to the plentiful and uncontradicted evi-
dence in the present case of the seriousness of Hodgkin's disease, includ-
ing that it is fatal in at least 75 per cent of the cases in a period of 
months or a few or many years and concluded that it falls clearly into 
the class of illnesses which, as a matter of law, increase the risk of loss. 
The holding that Hodgkin's disease increases the risk as a matter of 
law is hardly surprising, since the disease is considered to be a form of 
cancer. What is more significant is the Court's ruling that, even though 
it was not conclusively established that the insured had the disease at 
the time of his application, nevertheless the company was entitled as a 
matter of law to avoid the policy. 
In McDonough v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO.4 it was held to be 
a jury question whether the insured had cancer at the time the policy 
was issued because, despite uncontradicted medical evidence to that 
effect, it did not appear that the matter was undisputed. So in the 
Pahigian case the Court assumed that it need not be believed that the 
insured had Hodgkin's disease at the time of his application. Nonethe-
less, said the Court, the plaintiff was bound by her testimony admitting 
that the insured was hospitalized in April, 1959, and in August and 
September of 1960. The binding admission of the plaintiff, coupled 
with the insured's failure to disclose this medical history as required by 
the application form, established as a matter of law misrepresentations 
as to the existence of that history. 
The ... misrepresentations themselves increased the risk of loss .... 
[They] deprived the insurer of the opportunity to undertake 
2 G.L., c. 175, §186. 
S Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 339 Mass. 37, 157 N.E.2d 
518 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.3; McDonough v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., 228 Mass. 450, 117 N.E. 836 (1917). 
4228 Mass. 450, 117 N.E. 836 (1917). 
17
Burgoyne and Donovan: Chapter 17: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1965
260 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §17.18 
further investigation which, in all likelihood, would have re-
vealed the diagnosis of Hodgkin's disease .... Such misrepresenta-
tions were as prejudicial as would have been misrepresentations by 
the insured that he did not have Hodgkin's disease. In either case 
the insurer would have failed to receive the candid answers neces-
sary for it to evaluate the risk involved .... In these circumstances 
the insurer is entitled to avoid the policy.1> 
The Pahigian decision thus holds that the risk of loss to the insurer 
is increased by an applicant's concealment of information, such as a 
medical diagnosis, strongly evidencing the existence of a deadly disease. 
Although earlier cases had required the establishment of the actual 
existence of the disease, the present decision is correct. The chance that 
an insurer will pay benefits because of an early death are greater in the 
case of a person whose record contains such information than in the 
case of one similarly situated but without such a history. Even if it may 
later be found that the record information is wrong, this can be of no 
aid to the insurer at the time when it must make its decision whether 
to issue the policy applied for. It is as of that time that the materiality 
of the misrepresentations must be judged, for that is the time when, 
if at all, they induce the insurer to enter the contract. Since the mis-
representations in the Pahigian case were such as to forestall any in-
vestigation leading to the discovery of the adverse records, they thereby 
made it more likely that the company would issue the policy and under-
write a greater risk than the application disclosed. The misrepresenta-
tions themselves, as the Court said, increased the risk of loss.6 
In arriving at the question of increase of the risk, the Court ruled on 
problems raised by the alteration of the insured's application. The trial 
judge had ruled that the addition by the defendant's branch office 
manager, out of the insured's presence and after he had signed the 
application, of the words "good recovery" after the statement "Usual 
childhood diseases" constituted an alteration of the application requir-
ing exclusion of the application from evidence under General Laws, 
Chapter 175, Section 13l,7 and therefore the exclusion of the medical 
evidence contradicting the statements in the application. The Supreme 
Judicial Court said that the fact that the policy was issued at the com-
pany's head office outside the Commonwealth did not render the statute 
1>1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 645, 652, 206 N.E.2d 660, 666. 
6 Compare Lennon v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 339 Mass. 37, 157 
N.E.2d 518 (1959), 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.3, where the misrepresentation 
consisted of failure to disclose a serious operation. It was held that since the 
operation was for cancer (although the insured did not know what his ailment 
was), it increased the risk as a matter of law. However,. in that case it was un-
disputed by the plaintiff beneficiary that the insured in fact had cancer. 
7 G.L., c. 175, §131: "Unless a correct copy of the application is endorsed upon 
or attached to a policy of life or endowment insurance, when issued, the application 
shall not be considered a part of the policy or received in evidence for any purpose. 
Every such policy which contains a reference to the application, either as a part 
of the policy or as having any bearing thereon, shall have endorsed thereon or 
attached thereto, when issued, a correct copy of the application." 
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inapplicable to the policy, since everything except formal issuance oc-
curred here. The Court ruled, however, that the addition of "good 
recovery" was not such an alteration as to require exclusion of the ap-
plication. Slight or immaterial changes from an application as it exists 
at the time of signing do not result in making Section 131 operative. 
If the alteration here added anything to the meaning of "Usual child-
hood diseases" the addition was minimal. 
The 1965 SURVEY year case of Flanagan v. John Hancock Mutual Life 
Insurance Co.s also involved denials in the application of significant 
medical history and evidence at the trial of extensive treatment prior 
to the application for Hodgkin's disease. The evidence was that the 
treatment included deep X-ray therapy on numerous occasions. The 
trial judge charged the jury that the plaintiff beneficiary was bound by 
her testimony that the insured had received X-ray treatments, and 
charged further that the insured's denial in his application that he had 
ever had X-rays was false as a matter of law. The plaintiff argued that 
she was entitled to the benefit of any other evidence in the case which 
was more favorable to her on this issue and that the very denial by the 
insured in the application that he had X-rays was such evidence. The 
Supreme Judicial Court said that there was no suggestion in the record 
that the application, necessarily admissible as part of the insurance 
contract,9 was offered or received under General Laws, Chapter 233, 
Section 65, as a declaration of a deceased person evidencing the truth 
of the matters stated in it.lO Indeed the judge's charge pointed quite to 
the contrary. The misrepresentation as to X-ray treatments was there-
fore established as a matter of law. Although the trial judge had let the 
case go to the jury on the question of increase of the risk, and the jury 
found for the insurer, the Supreme Judicial Court treated the false 
denial of X-rays like the false denial of hospitalizations in the Pahigian 
case, and held that by depriving the insurer of the opportunity by in-
vestigation to discover the diagnosis of Hodgkin's disease it increased 
the risk as a matter of law. 
§17.19. Nonlapsation for failure to pay premiums during strike 
of collection agents. General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 187F, in-
serted by Acts of 1963, Chapter 796, was declared invalid by the Su-
preme Judicial Court in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Commissioner of Insurance.1 
The statute provided that no life insurance policy, noncancellable 
disability insurance contract, hospital expense or hospital and surgical 
expense contract now or hereafter in force in the Commonwealth, 
premiums for which are "normally collected" by insurance agents em-
s 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1023,208 N.E.2d 497. 
9 Under G.L., c. 175, §131, quoted in note 7 supra. See also G.L., c. 175, §132, 
subsec.3. 
10 Shurdut v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 320 Mass. 728. 730-731. 
71 N.E.2d 391, 392 (1947). 
§17.19. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 208 N.E.2d 516, also noted in §§11.3, 15.11 
supra. 
19
Burgoyne and Donovan: Chapter 17: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1965
262 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §17.19 
ployed by the insurer, should terminate or lapse by reason of default in 
payment of any premium, installment, or interest on any policy loan 
payable to the insurer during a period its agents are on strike. It al-
lowed the premium payer a grace period of thirty-one days following 
the "authorized" termination of the strike in which to pay the pre-
mium, installment, or loan interest, during which time the policy or 
contract was to continue in full force and effect. Provision was made, 
in the event a claim should arise during a strike or grace period, for 
the overdue premium or installment and interest thereon, and the 
amount of any policy loan and interest, to be "deducted" from the 
amount payable under the policy. 
An insurance company, doing extensive business both within and 
without the Commonwealth in the kinds of policies which the statute 
apparently was designed to embrace, proposed to issue an endorsement 
as to each such policy theretofore or thereafter issued by it. The en-
dorsement provided, as the sole effect of a strike upon policy obliga-
tions, a reinstatement privilege more favorable to policyholders than 
the policies had provided. The endorsement, however, was less favor-
able than the provisions of Section 187F to holders of policies the 
premiums for which are normally collected by the company's insurance 
agents. For this reason the Commissioner of Insurance disapproved the 
use of the endorsement when its form was submitted to him pursuant 
to statute.2 
The company petitioned for review of the Commissioner's action, 
contending that Section 187F, the only statute which the form did not 
comply with, was invalid, and therefore was no bar to use of the en-
dorsement. Other interested insurers, the Life Insurance Association of 
America, and the Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO 
(which had pressed for enactment of the statute), submitted briefs as 
amici curiae. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute was 
invalid because in conflict with the federal labor relations policy foster-
ing collective bargaining free from coercion by state laws. It did not 
pass upon several other arguments of the company which included 
contentions that the statute violated constitutional protections against 
deprivation of property without due process of law and against im-
pairment of contracts. 
The Court held that on the facts presented the company's labor rela-
tions with its collecting or debit agents (with whom the company had a 
collective bargaining agreement) were subject to the National Labor 
Relations Act, as amended.s By virtue of the Supremacy Clause4 of the 
United States Constitution, any state enactment conflicting with federal 
law is invalid. Section 187F was not within any of the express grants by 
2 G.L., c. 175, §§22A, 108 d. 2(a), 132, 192. 
S 49 Stat. 449, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§151-168 (1964). See 59 Stat. 
33-34, 15 U.S.C. §§1011-1015 (1964), the McCarran-Ferguson Act, allowing the states 
to regulate interstate insurance business but specifically leaving unaffected the 
application to such business of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 
4 U.S. Cor..st., art. VI, par. 2. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/20
§17.19 INSURANCE 263 
Congress to the states of power over certain aspects of interstate labor 
relations, nor did it operate in a field which prior case law had shown 
to be clearly within state or clearly within federal control. Therefore its 
validity, said the Court, was to be determined by the extent to which its 
operational effects were in conflict with the purposes and policy of 
the federal labor laws. On this question it was irrelevant that the 
statute was presumably enacted for purposes not related to labor rela-
tions. For, regardless of its purpose, it plainly had profound effect upon 
collective bargaining between the company and its debit agents. 
The facts of the case showed that the company's policies by their ex-
press terms require, and in issuing them the company relied upon, pay-
ment of premiums in advance of the period for which insurance benefits 
are provided, and that except as otherwise allowed by the usual grace 
period and nonforfeiture clauses, coverage ceases at the end of the 
period for which the most recent premium has been paid. The require-
ment of advance payment makes the premiums available for payment 
of expenses and claims, loans and nonforfeiture benefits, and also for 
investment. 
The Court held that the effect of Section 187F was to enhance the 
power of the strike weapon in the hands of the company's agents, for a 
strike would not merely deprive the company of the agents' services. It 
would deprive it of its right to enforce policy provisions requiring pre-
payment of premiums as a condition precedent to insurance coverage 
under policies on which premiums are "normally collected" by the com-
pany's agents. This deprivation would occur not only throughout the 
strike but for thirty-one days after the "authorized termination" of the 
strike. The effect on the company would be severe. The company, de-
prived of current income, might be forced to liquidate investments in 
order to pay current claims, loans, and nonforfeiture benefits. It would 
also be in doubt as to who among those insured at the beginning of the 
strike remain insured. The Court said that it did not appear that the 
company could enforce the collection of premium arrearages after the 
strike from those who should then claim they had intended to let their 
policies lapse. 
Presumably those terminating their insurance by nonpayment of 
arrearages would only be those who had neither suffered losses 
nor became increased risks during the strike, resulting in a process 
of self-selection, predicated upon the insurant's self-interest (see 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 u.S. 24, 32), which would be 
adverse to the petitioner'S contractual rights, and in contravention 
of sound actuarial principles upon which the insurance business 
is required by law to be conducted.1I 
111965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 1017-1018, 208 N.E.2d 516, 524. The Statham case is 
also reported at 23 L. Ed. 789 (1876). The United States Supreme Court, 93 U.S. at 
30, 23 L. Ed. at 791, recognized: "All the calculations of the insurance company 
are based on the hypothesis of prompt payments. They not only calculate on the 
receipt of the premiums when due, but on compounding interest upon them." 
That Court went on to note that the business is based upon the law of averages 
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Even if provision could be made for a right to collect arrearages, collec-
tion costs which might be substantial would be involved, whereas under 
the system of prepayment of premiums basic to the insurance business 
these costs are not incurred. 
The Court held that these prospective losses to the petitioner are in-
escapably contrary to the actuarial basis upon which the business of 
insurance is operated because they cannot be definitely provided for 
through adjusted premiums even in policies permitting change of pre-
miums. The incidence of strikes is not predictable. The timing of a 
strike is exclusively, and its duration is largely, within the control of 
the bargaining unit of the company's agents. The statute in question 
thus gave the agents' union the power to inflict serious economic loss 
on the company and in doing so provided additional coercive strength 
to the agents' representatives at the bargaining table. The Court felt 
that these effects conflicted with Congressional intent that parties to 
collective bargaining should have wide latitude in their negotiations, 
unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive 
solution of their differences.6 Although Section 187F did not regulate 
any substantive term of a labor-management agreement, it gave the 
union a potent weapon which could not fail unilaterally to restrict the 
desired bilateral freedom of collective bargaining which Congress left 
free for operation of economic forces. "For the State to intrude into 
such an area designed to be kept free is as much a violation of the 
Federal policy as it is for a State to attempt to regulate rights or duties 
specifically protected by the Federal acts."7 The Court said that Sec-
tion 187F tended to compel submission by the company in any labor 
dispute with its agents, a compulsion that is repugnant to the national 
policy favoring agreements arrived at in free collective bargaining. It 
compared Section 187F with General Laws, Chapter 150, Section 3. The 
latter statute required the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration 
to ascertain and publish which party to a labor dispute was mainly 
responsible or blameworthy for its existence or continuance. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that provision 
to be contrary to the national policy not to compel agreement but only 
to encourage voluntary agreements.s 
with the risks spread out over a large number of people (so that premiums of 
those who turn out to be healthy or long.lived make up the deficit of benefits paid 
out over premiums paid in for those who are not so fortunate) and said, 9!1 U.S. at 
!l2, 2!1 L. Ed. at 792: "If every policy lapsed by reason of the war should be revived, 
and all the back premiums should be paid, the companies would have the benefit 
of this average amount of risk. But the good risks are never heard from; only the bad 
are sought to be revived, where the person insured is either dead or dying. Those 
in health can get new policies cheaper than to pay arrearages on the old. To enforce 
a revival of the bad cases, whilst the company necessarily lose the cases which are 
desirable, would be manifestly unjust." 
6 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int. Union, AFL-CIO, !l61 U.S. 477, 488, 80 Sup. 
Ct. 419, 426, 4 L. Ed. 2d 454, 46!1 (1960). 
71965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 1019, 208 N.E.2d 516, 525. 
8 General Electric Co. v. Callahan, 294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub 
nom. Callahan v. General Electric Co., !l69 U.S. 8!12 (1961). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court went on to hold that in addition to the 
general interference with free collective bargaining, Section 187F inter-
fered with rights, specifically protected under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as amended,9 of employees not to strike and of employers 
guilty of no act proscribed by the N .L.R.A. to continue their business 
by hiring replacements for strikers. By suspending the obligation of 
policyholders to pay premiums, Section 187F had the effect of sharply 
curtailing or eliminating premium collection work available for non-
striking workers or replacements, rendering these rights nugatory. 
The Court concluded that the statute was invalid, and even if there 
had been a showing of a significant state concern which prompted its 
enactment this still could not have saved it in view of its inherent in-
compatibility with federal labor laws. 
D. LIFE INSURANCE - LEGISLATION 
§17.20. Insurance companies: Variable annuities and pension con-
tract funding agreements. Acts of 1965, Chapter 260, authorized 
variable annuity insurance companiesl to grant their variable annuity 
contract holders such voting rights as the companies deem necessary 
to qualify under the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, as 
amended.2 The United States Supreme Court had held in Securities & 
Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.s that 
such companies were within the purview of that act, that their variable 
annuity contracts were within the coverage of the Federal Securities Act 
of 1933,4 and that neither was within the "insurance," "insurance com-
pany," "insurance contract," or "annuity contract" exceptions written 
into those Acts5 or in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 And 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Prudential 
Insurance Co. of America v. Securities & Exchange Commission7 had 
affirmed a holding of the S.E.C. that, while a large insurance company 
not primarily engaged in the securities business was exempt from the 
Investment Company Act, its separate variable annuity investment fund 
constituted an "investment company" within the meaning of, and sub-
ject to, the act. 
By Acts of 1960, Chapter 562, inserting General Laws, Chapter 175, 
Section 132F, the legislature permitted life insurance companies to 
enter "funding agreements" with holders of "pension contracts" so as to 
provide not only for the payment of guaranteed annuities, the funds 
961 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C. §§157, 158(a)(I), 158(b)(I)(A) (1964). 
§17.20. 1 See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.19. 
254 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§80a-l to 80a-52. 
s 359 U.S. 65, 79 Sup. Ct. 618, 3 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1959). 
448 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77bbbb (1964). 
I) Investment Company Act, §§3(c)(3), 2(a)(17), 54 Stat. 789, 797, 15 U.S.C. 
§§80a-3(c)(3), 80a-2(a)(17) (1964); Securities Act, §3(a)(8), 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 
15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(8) (1964). 
659 Stat. 34, 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (1964). 
7326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). 
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and reserves for which must meet the companies' conservative general 
investment requirements, but also in the same contracts for nonguaran-
teed annuities, the funds for which may be more liberally invested 
through a separate investment account.S Such contracts are a compro-
mise between standard annuity contracts and variable annuity con-
tracts. Acts of 1965, Chapter 296, revised Section 132F. The 1965 statute 
principally provided that a life insurance company (I) may maintain 
more than one such separate account; (2) may, with the permission of 
the Commissioner of Insurance, transfer investments between a separate 
account and the company's general investment account when such 
transfers would not be inequitable; and (3) may accept in payment of 
amounts due it under a funding agreement a transfer of assets held 
under a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or retirement plan. 
§17.2I. Insurance companies: Investments. Acts of 1965, Chapters 
269 and 300, changed the requirements concerning securities in which 
domestic insurance companies may invest their capital and reserves. 
Chapter 269 amended paragraphs l4A and l4C of Section 63, Chapter 
175 of the General Laws, so as to make possible somewhat freer invest-
ment of a portion of a company's capital or reserve in bonds, notes, and 
certain other securities of American and Canadian firms, particularly 
when such firms are banks or are engaged in the finance or factoring 
business. Chapter 300 adds a new paragraph 14F to Section 63, allow-
ing investment in equipment or chattels, or obligations secured thereby, 
acquired for sale or lease to qualified governmental units or business 
firms. It follows the theme of Chapter 269 of the Acts of 1965 by setting 
less stringent earnings history requirements in order for banks and 
finance and factoring companies to constitute qualified firms. 
§17.22. Insurance companies: Retirement from the field. Acts of 
1965, Chapter 499, amended General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 44, by 
adding a provision enabling an insurance company to cease issuing 
policies but to continue in existence as a corporation subject to the 
business corporation laws. This change will require the permission of 
the Commissioner of Insurance, the dropping of the word "insurance" 
or "assurance" from the company name, the filing of articles of amend-
ment with the State Secretary, and the making of adequate provision 
for assumption by qualified solvent companies of all outstanding risks 
and claims. A retiring insurance company will continue to be liable on 
all its obligations, and the Commissioner may require that it deposit in 
trust a contingency fund out of which such obligations may be satisfied. 
The company, however, will be freed of asset restrictions applicable to 
insurance companies. 
§17.23. Life insurance: Dividends on industrial and debit policies. 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 567, amended General Laws, Chapter 175, Sec-
tion 140, so as to provide that the annual surplus distribution on par-
ticipating industrial and debit life insurance policies, which must begin 
not later than the end of the fifth policy year, shall annually, at the op-
SSee 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.l5; 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.19. 
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tion of the owner, be (a) payable in cash, or (b) applied in reduction of 
premiums, or (c) left on deposit with the company to accumulate at 
interest, or (d) used to purchase paid up additions to the policy. This 
enactment gives options to the policyholders concerning methods of 
distribution of dividends apportioned to industrial policies, whereas in 
recent years the manner of distribution of industrial policy dividends 
had been left to the discretion of the company with the approval of 
the Commissioner of Insurance. It also categorizes all future "debit" 
life insurance policies with industrial policies, for dividend purposes, 
and thus makes inapplicable to them the somewhat different dividend 
option treatment heretofore specified in Section 140 for all nonindus-
trial participating life policies.! It thereby changes, from the end of the 
third to the end of the fifth policy year, the time by which annual sur-
plus distribution will be required to begin on "debit" life policies. 
There is no definition of "debit" policies in the statute, but companies 
will probably insert provisions consonant with the new statute in forms 
for life policies as to which it is intended that premiums regularly be 
paid directly to agents who visit personally to collect them. 
§17.23. 1 See 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.l7. 
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